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THE OUTLOOK FOR MOROCCO

(Advance Conclusions)

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 29 January 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

29 January 1957

SUBJECT: NIE 71.1-57: THE OUTLOOK FOR MOROCCO

THE PROBLEM

To assess prospects for Moroccan stability and viability;
and to estimate the probable orientation and policies of an
independent Morocco over the next few years.

CONCLUSIONS

1. At least for the short term, the Sultan and the Istiqlal Party are likely to cooperate, and the Moroccan government will probably maintain an essential minimum of control over the country. Although extreme elements may break away from the Istiqlal and form opposition groups, the government probably will retain the capability for keeping political extremism in check for the next year or two. Over the long run, mounting political opposition probably will compel the Sultan to cede much of his secular authority to representative political leaders. (Paras. 10, 22)

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2. Morocco's economic difficulties will continue to be severe over the next few years. We estimate that Morocco now requires up to \$100 million of new foreign investment annually even to maintain the present low standard of living. (Paras. 14, 16)

3. So long as Morocco remains economically dependent on France, the French will be able to retain some special privileges in Morocco. (Paras. 13, 15)

4. Morocco will almost certainly not reach a settlement on major issues with France as long as the Algerian conflict continues. An intensification of that conflict would lead to increasing violence against French colons and troops in Morocco, in which event, the Moroccan government might be unable to control widespread disorders. (Paras. 10-12, 19)

5. Morocco will look increasingly to the US for diplomatic support and economic aid, especially if friction with France continues. Should the US fail substantially to meet Moroccan expectations, the present leadership would probably seek greater diversification of its sources of aid, turning to certain Western European nations and even to the Soviet Bloc. However, Communist Bloc countries are unlikely to develop any substantial influence in Morocco over the short term. Given US support and assistance, the Moroccans are likely to regard continuation of the US base program with favor. (Paras. 17, 21)

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